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World Hunger, the ‘Global’ Food Crisis, and (International) Law 
 
 
 
The global food crisis 2007 — 11 has been described by the UN Human Rights 
Committee as a failure of national and international policies to ensure access to food for all. 
Another influential camp attributes the crisis to another kind of failure—market failure. This 
article seeks to qualify these prevalent views on two principal grounds. First, the tendency to 
ascribe the predicament of hungry peoples to failureof policy, markets, or bothdistracts 
from the fact that commodity markets were working in this same period for the benefit of other 
actors in the global economy. Second, the focus on policy elides the equally important role that 
law has played in this context. Legal solutions are highly visible in debates on how to tackle 
hunger. Less visible are the ways in which legal regimes have entrenched the same conditions 
of poverty and precarity to which legal remedies are now offered in response. The article 
argues that not only must the global legal order be understood as a producer of hunger in the 
world, but that bodies of law that constitute the global food system may present the greatest 
obstacle to efforts by the international community to eradicate it. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The global food crisis was precipitated by extreme levels of price volatility in 
international commodity markets. While many commodities were affected, the most 
prodigious inflation occurred in markets for grain. Between 2007 and 2008 the prices of 
maize, rice, and wheat underwent record levels of inflation, doubling, in some cases, in a 
matter of months.1 The rising cost of food triggered food riots in more than 25 countries 
worldwide.2 Approximately half of the calories consumed by the world’s poor are accounted 
for by these three staple grains.3 Consequently, the human cost of these market movements 
was very high. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimates that an 
additional 100 million people were pushed into hunger and poverty as a result of grain price 
volatility in 2008 alone.4 Although commodity prices plummeted rapidly in 2009, grain 
prices moved in a similar trajectory between the second half of 2010 and late 2011.5 Corn and 
                                                      
1
 David Mitchell, ‘A Note on Rising Food Prices.’ World Bank Working Paper (2008), at 3. 
2
 Ray Bush, ‘Food riots: Poverty, Power and Protest.’ Journal of Agrarian Change, 2010, 10(1), at 121. 
3
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wheat prices are currently a ten year low,6 generating optimism those who are net buyers of 
food will benefit.7 Nevertheless, it is thought that domestic food price fluctuations may still 
occur.8 In any case, the slump in commodity prices poses a serious threat to welfare in 
commodity-dependent countries in the global South.9  
  
In response to these events, a UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security 
Crisis (HLTF) was established in April 2008.10 Alongside efforts to scale up investment in 
food and nutrition security, the HLTF recommends an array of reforms to improve the 
structure and functioning of commodity markets.11 The HLTF also endorses a renewed 
commitment to pre-existing approaches to tackling hunger, such as the Zero Hunger 
Challenge,12 and a new commitment to principles-based agricultural development, based on 
the 2009 Rome Principles on Food Security.13 Emphasis on the use of legal tools to address 
food insecurity is prominent. A cornerstone of the post-crisis reform is renewed commitment 
to the progressive realization of the right to adequate food. The HLTF, the FAO, and the 
World Bank also advocate for an approach to tackling hunger based on human rights 
principles, namely those of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, transparency, 
human dignity, empowerment and the rule of law (PANTHER).14 Other recommendations for 
legal reforms include the strengthening of domestic labour law, adjustments to the trade 
regime, and the recognition of indigenous rights to land.15  
  
                                                      
6
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7
 World Bank, ‘Global Food Prices Drop to a Five-Year Low.’ 1 July 2015, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/07/01/global-food-prices-drop-to-a-five-year-low 
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9
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 HLTF on the Global Food Security Crisis, ‘Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action.’2010, 
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 Particular emphasis is placed on support for smallholder farming and promoting ecological and sustainable 
agricultural development, as well as the need to strengthen social safety net and the multilateral trading 
system. Ibid, at 3. 
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 The Zero Hunger Challenge is a global call to action, issued by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon in 2012, 
that sets a challenge to eliminate hunger ‘in our lifetimes’. http://www.un.org/en/zerohunger/challenge.shtml  
accessed 26 June 2016. 
13
 ‘Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security.’ World Summit on Food Security, Rome, 16-18 
November 2009. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fishery/wsfs0911-2.pdf accessed 16 February 2017. 
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That these actions represent a sincere effort by the international community to 
respond to the global food crisis is not in doubt. Nevertheless, this article asserts that there is 
an urgent need to challenge pervasive understandings of the causes of the crisis, which, being 
both inaccurate and misleading, are undermining efforts to improve the lives of hungry 
peoples. The first argument, made in Part Two, is that focusing on market failure and the 
failure of food security policy distracts from the benefits that the market status quo bestowed 
on other market actors during this same period. This analysis seeks to advance the call made 
by Margot Salomon and others, who have argued that matters of poverty and hunger have to 
be understood in relational terms.16 The argument developed in Part Three takes issue with 
the evident tendency to invoke poor policymaking by domestic governments in countries 
affected as an underlying cause of the crisis. As a growing body of critical scholarship has 
shown, the ability of these countries to make policy that could benefit the hungry has been 
constrained by dictates emanating from the international arena.17 This section of the article 
focuses explicitly on the contribution of law in this context. It will map the different ways in 
which legal rules, regimes, and discourse form part of a global legal order that has to be 
understood as a producer of hunger in the world. Part Four will conclude by drawing 
attention to a number of limitations to the use of legal tools to address world hunger, most 
notably, an unwillingness to acknowledge that it may precisely those bodies of law that 
constitute the global food system that are standing in the way of this goal. 
 
 
2. The ‘Global’ Food Crisis: Rethinking the Rhetoric of Failure  
 
An initial objection that can be raised to the language used to discuss the global food 
crisis is the somewhat casual use of the term ‘global’. The price volatility did affect 
international commodity markets and many countries registered some effects. However, this 
was in no sense a global crisis in terms of the magnitude of those effects. Levels of 
transmission of the volatility into the domestic economy varied significantly between 
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 Margot Salomon, ‘Why should it matter that others have more? Poverty, inequality, and the potential of 
international human rights law.’ LSE Working Paper, 2010, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/humanRights/documents/2011/SalomonIRLS.pdf accessed 16 February 2017. 
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different countries.18 Food price inflation was typically far greater in poorer countries in the 
global South than in many richer ones in Europe, or in the US.19 In terms of domestic food 
price inflation, increased poverty and malnutrition, and the duration of the impact, people 
living in low-income countries in the global South were overwhelmingly worst affected.20 
Nor was the impact of the price volatility within countries evenly distributed. While richer 
consumers were able to afford rising prices, or source their food elsewhere, the poor in 
countries both wealthy and impoverished suffered most. The groups impacted most severely 
were casual wage laborers (both rural and urban), land-poor farmers, petty traders, and 
producers of commodities—notably pastoralists in Kenya, cotton farmers in Benin and tea 
workers in Bangladesh.21  
 
Moving on to consider why these populations suffered most acutely, this is commonly 
attributed to pre-existing ‘food insecurity’ in the countries affected.22 Yet, as a number of 
scholars have argued, the lens of food insecurity is a relatively weak one. It fails to bring into 
focus the deeper structural reasons animating the lack of access to food that publications like 
the State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI) document so meticulously.23 In the HLTF’s 
Comprehensive Framework for Action ‘inadequacies’ in the structure and functioning of the 
global food system are acknowledged. Increasing inequalities in access to and control over 
productive resources, decades of under-investment in agriculture, and a lack of support for 
social safety nets are identified as key contributors to food insecurity.24 Yet, there is little 
attempt to connect these phenomena in a meaningful way, or to explain the either the history 
or policy climate in which this pervasive disenfranchisement came about. Described without 
being explained, these problematic features of the environments in which the food insecure 
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 Sharada Keats et al, ‘Food price transmission: rising international cereals prices and domestic markets,’ ODI 
Project Briefing no.48, October 2010, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-
opinion-files/6240.pdf accessed 16 February 2017. 
19
 Maros Ivanic and Will Martin, ‘Implications of higher global food prices for poverty in low-income countries.’ 
World Bank Working Paper, WPS 4594, 2008, 
http://www.fanrpan.org/documents/d00529/WB_food_prices_report_Apr2008.pdf accessed 16 February 
2017. 
20
 Supra Keats, note 18.  
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 Supra Ivanic and Martin, note 19, at iii.  
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 Food insecurity is defined by the FAO as ‘[a] situation that exists when people lack secure access to sufficient 
amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth and development and an active and healthy life’. FAO, 
‘Basic definitions,’ http://www.fao.org/hunger/en/ accessed 26 June 2016. 
23
 For critical commentary on food insecurity see Erid Holt-Giménez, ‘Food security, food justice, or food 
sovereignty. Crises, food movements, and regime change.’ in Alison Hope Alkon, and Julian Agyeman (eds.) 
Cultivating food justice: Race, class, and sustainability (The MIT Press, 50644th edition, 2011), at 309-330; See 
further Raj Patel, ‘Food sovereignty.’ The Journal of Peasant Studies, 2009, 36(3). 
24
 Supra HLTF, note 10, at 2. 
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are immersed read as natural characteristics of their surroundings.25 For all of the apparent 
progress beyond attributing hunger to the ‘vagaries of nature’,26 a tendency identified by 
Susan George in the 1980s, food insecurity continues to be largely attributed to domestic 
environments in which the food insecure are blighted by a lack of resources (natural and 
financial), inundated with diseases, uprooted by conflict, and in this latest episode, 
destabilised by volatile food prices. When concrete governments and policies do come into 
the frame of analysis, it is largely domestic policy making within food insecure states that is 
seen to be at fault. Repeated references to ‘Africa’s poor track record’ in agricultural 
production,27 and ‘under-investment in agriculture’,28 alongside observations that most poor 
households were ‘left to cope on their own with high price rises’ evince criticism of these 
states.29 This is reinforced by a tendency to characterise institutions in the South as being 
‘weak’ and governance as being ‘poor’ without an explanation of the criteria that have 
warranted such an assessment.30 By contrast, governments of countries in the global North, 
even those that export large volumes of grain, such as the US, rarely figure at all in analysis 
of the causes of the global food crisis. They appear only after the fact, as leading members of 
the ‘international community’, acting in an ameliorative capacity. Links between the 
international community and responsibility for the global food crisis—if and when they are 
made—are typically framed in terms of failure.31  
 
The vernacular of failure is prevalent throughout the literature on the causes of the crisis. 
Analysts continue to position ‘crop failure’ as a proximate cause of the price volatility,32 
despite evidence that the spikes in 2007-8 and 2010-11 cannot convincingly be attributed to a 
lack of supply of the grains in question.33 It is also common to read of the ‘failure of the 
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 Ibid.  
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 Susan George, How the other half dies. The real reasons for world hunger. (Washington DC, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1989), at 46. 
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 Derek Heady and Shenggen Fan, ‘Reflections on the Global Food Crisis: How Did It Happen? How Has It Hurt? 
And How Can We Prevent the Next One?’, International Food Policy Research Institute, Research Monograph, 
2010, no. 65, at 2. 
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 Supra HLTF, note 10, at 2. 
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 Supra Keats, note 18, at iv. 
30
 FAO, ‘The State of Food Security in the World 2014: Strengthening the enabling environment 
for food security and nutrition’, 2014, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4030e.pdf accessed 16 February 2017, at 14. 
31
 Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Statement on the World Food Crisis’ (2008) UN Doc 
E/C.12/2008/1, para 9. 
32
 See Geoffrey Lean attributing the global food crisis almost entirely to failures in supply. Geoffrey Lean, 
‘There's a food crisis coming. Are we ready?’ The Telegraph, 14 August 2015.   
33
 Analysts at the UK Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) have emphasised, there was 
‘comfortably enough food globally’ when prices skyrocketed in 2007-08. DEFRA, ‘The 2007/08 Agricultural 
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global food system’.34 Another prevalent trend is to posit the global food crisis as an instance 
of ‘market failure’—the heuristic now widely employed by economists and policy makers to 
discuss when governmental intervention in the market is and isn’t warranted.35 In some 
respects, the invocation of market failure to explain the crisis is has critical bite as it 
acknowledges that the self-interested pursuit of profit in the global food system has resulted 
in sub-optimal social outcomes. The problem pertains in that the use of the term market 
failure creates the impression that the socially sub-optimal pursuit of profit was taking place 
in markets that operating beyond, or at a distance from, government supervision and 
regulation. This, as will be discussed in Part Two, is misleading.  Rather than being brought 
about by ‘free’ markets operating inefficiently, as a market failure analysis would suggest, 
the operations of international commodity markets prior to the crisis were a function of active 
government interventions and market policies. It has been those policies and lawsand many 
of them orchestrated at the international levelthat actively enable and encourage self-
interested, profit-seeking market behaviour and not the inadequate constraint of that 
behaviour that can be seen to be at the root of the global food crisis.  
 
Of significant import is the fact that the dominance of failure discourse also elides the 
extent to which other actors were experiencing what can only be understood as market 
success at this time. Large grain multinationals including Glencore and Cargill made record 
profits during the food crisis.36 Cargill reported an approximate 70 per cent increase in its 
profits compared with 2007 and an increase of 157 per cent compared with 2006.37 Other 
beneficiaries were financial and commercial actors speculating on volatile grain price via 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Price Spikes: Causes and Policy Implications,’ http://archive.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/food/pdf/ag—
price100105.pdf accessed 26 June 2016, at 9.  
34
 Jim Harkness, The 2050 challenge to our global food system, 2011, http://www.iatp.org/documents/the-
2050-challenge-to-our-global-food-system accessed 27 June 2016. 
35
 In economics the concept of market failure refers to a situation in which resources cannot be allocated 
efficiently due to the breakdown of the price mechanism. This can be caused by factors such as information 
failure, missing or incomplete markets, monopoly power, and negative social externalities. See ‘Economics 
Online’, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Market_failures/Types_of_market_failure.html  accessed 26 June 
2016. 
36
 Joachim Von Braun, ‘Food and Financial Crises: Implications for Agriculture and the Poor,’ International Food 
Policy Research Institute, 2008, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6289061.pdf accessed 16 February 2017, at 
7. 
37
 GRAIN, ‘Corporations are still making a killing from hunger’, April 2009, 
http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=592 accessed 16 February 2017. 
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instruments such as commodity index funds.38 Goldman Sachs made around $5 billion from 
commodities trading in 2009,39 and JP Morgan made $2.8 billion from commodity 
transactions, which made up more than a quarter of the bank’s principal transactions in 
2011.40 As NGOs like Global Justice Now and Oxfam emphasise, speculation in financial 
instruments linked to the price of grain made a significant contribution to commodity price 
volatility during this period.41  
 
Writing on poverty and human rights law, Salomon has argued that it is essential for 
international lawyers to think of poverty in terms of the inequality that characterises our 
contemporary world order.42 Salomon’s analysis of the position of the world’s poor also 
applies to the world’s hungry: it is not (just) that they cannot afford to participate in global 
markets to access food, but they are unable to participate as others do.43 A 2002 study by 
Mike Davis speaks to the significance of this imbalance in market power. Davis’s study 
demonstrated that a number of late 19th century famines that had been attributed to variations 
in temperature caused by the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, were, to a significant extent, 
produced by the incorporation of poorer countries into global market structures. The market 
power of richer consumers was behind the famine: ‘Londoners were in fact eating India’s 
bread’,44 he concludes. Similarly, behind the ‘supply and demand’ factors routinely named as 
causes of the global food crisis one finds a host of other human beings who were benefiting 
from the same market events.45 The same grain that could have fed hungry people in 2007-11 
                                                      
38
 Terry Jones, ‘The great hunger lottery: How bank speculation causes food crises,’ World Development 
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Paper, 2012, https://www.somo.nl/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Challenges-for-Regulators-web.pdf accessed 
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was being purchased by farmers to feed cattle to produce beef. Other grains, particularly 
maize, benefited those who fuel engines with biofuel, or profit from its sale. Speculators and 
agribusiness were able to profit by investing in both physical grain and in commodity 
derivatives, playing both sides of the market. If it follows that powerful actors who benefited 
from commodity market dynamics during this period are also likely to have exerted greater 
influence over both the operation of the markets, and over pertinent policymaking for those 
markets, is it really convincing to continue ascribing these events to policy and market 
‘failures’? 
 
Upon scrutiny, many of the strategies posited to tackle world hunger in the post-crisis 
period fall squarely into the trap discussed by Salomon, and also by Craven, which is to focus 
too much on scarcity to the determinant of questions of distribution.46 The result is the 
propagation of solutions which attempt to elevate the market power of the hungry without 
providing an account of how this can be achieved without reducing the market power of other 
actors—an argument that will be developed in Part Three. The next section will focus on the 
role of the global legal order in constituting the market power of wealthy actors in the global 
economy, and in entrenching conditions of precariousness for hungry peoples. 
 
 
3. The Global Legal Order as a Producer of Hunger in the World 
 
The lens of food security has dominated analysis of the causes of hunger since the 1980s, 
when the development economist Amartya Sen revolutionised thinking on the causes of 
famine with his analytic of ‘entitlements’.47 Sen demonstrated that, more often than not, 
hunger is suffered not because of a lack of available food, but due to the inability of people to 
command access to food in a market economy. His most valuable contribution is often said to 
be that it shifted attention away from a fixation on food supplies.48 One of the greatest 
drawbacks of his approach is that it has helped to promote an almost obsessive focus on the 
various forms of ‘lack’ suffered by the ‘food insecure’ without prompting much 
                                                      
46
 Supra Salomon, note 16, at 18; Matthew Craven, ‘The Violence of Dispossession: Extraterritoriality and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Mashood Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), at 86. 
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legally command access to food. Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
48
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consideration of the historical and political reasons for that lack.49 This focus on lack a 
lack of title to land, lack of resources, lack education, and, more broadly, of economic power 
and economic developmentcan mean that those that are more entitled remain outside of the 
frame of analysis, as discussed above. Others, including Edkins, are critical of Sen on the 
basis that his use of the word ‘entitlement’ ‘does not reflect in any sense a concept of the 
right to food or a concept of what people might be entitled to as a human right or as a 
question of justice’.50 While Edkins may be correct on that score, an often overlooked merit 
of Sen’s work is that it can also be read as a subtle but nonetheless powerful critique of a 
society in which famine ‘reflects legality with a vengeance’—the final sentence of his 
acclaimed book.51 What his work also demonstrates is that hunger and famine are, more often 
than not, products of the legal system. It is not just Sen’s use of the word ‘entitlement’ that is 
insensitive to the human right to food or questions of justice—it is the legal system itself that 
is unresponsive. At least, this would appear to be the case in the type of legal system that 
typically underpins a market society—a legal system in which food is a commodity to be 
bought and sold for profit by those able to claim ownership of it.  
 
The following sections will attempt to lend precision to how the interplay of legal 
concepts, legal discourse, legal institutions, and legal regimes—many of them part and parcel 
of public international law—has helped to produce and sustain the sufferance of hunger 
worldwide.  
 
 
A. Colonialism, Developmentalism, and Public International Law 
 
 
The civilising mission of nineteenth century international law was centred on the ‘dual 
mandate’—the belief that colonialism brought industrial benefit for Europeans, and progress 
for the native races of the colonies.52 Natives were to be helped to make productive use of the 
abundant raw materials in their territories that lay ‘wasted and ungarnered’ because they ‘did 
not know their use and value’.53 Colonial practices advanced under this mandate had a 
                                                      
49
 For more critical analysis of Sen, see Ben Fine, ‘Entitlement failure?’ Development and Change, 1995, 28: 
617-647 and Jenny Edkins, Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine and Practices of Aid. (Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000). 
50
 Ibid, Edkins, at 59. 
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 Supra Sen, note 47, at 166. 
52
 Frederick. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa (London: Frank Cass, 1965). 
53
 Ibid, at 615. 
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profound impact on both present and future dynamics of agricultural production within 
colonised states. Enforced export specialisation meant that large tracts of prime agricultural 
land in India, Africa, and the Americas were shifted from food production to cash crop 
production.54 Infrastructure, such as railways and roads, were built to carry products from the 
interior to the coast, and not to encourage or facilitate trade within the region.55 This 
increased countries’ reliance on imports for food staples, and particularly grain.56 
Furthermore, access to a new abundance of raw materials and cheap imports gave the 
colonising countries a huge economic advantage, enabling them to industrialise and develop 
their economies in the same period.57 This put former colonies at a further structural 
disadvantage as they were incorporated into the ‘global machinations of things’.58  
 
As Anthony Angie has shown, colonial trespasses were advanced under legitimating 
framework of public international law that reconciled exploitative treatment of native 
populations on the basis that they were ‘uncivilised’ and therefore undeserving of the same 
rights as ‘civilised’ Europeans.59 Beyond law’s role as a legitimating framework, other legal 
transplants, including the sale of labour power and private property, contributed to the spread 
of European modes of legal consciousness during this period. Kennedy has related how new 
distinctions between the private and public realms were erected, and a culture of 
individualism and commitment to interpretive formalism was fostered through new legal 
institutions that were set up.60 Thus, the transference of legal norms can also be understood to 
have contributed to a shift in the mind sets of many colonised peoples, who began to relate to 
their land, work, social and economic institutions, and to one another other in new ways. It 
was largely as a consequence of a Liberal legal inheritance, Kennedy maintains, that, post-
decolonisation, many newly independent states simply ratified ‘whatever schemes of 
economic and social hierarchy emerged out of the play of violence and culture on the 
                                                      
54
 Carmen Gonzalez, ‘The Global Food Crisis: Law, Policy, and the Elusive Quest for Justice’ Yale Human Rights 
and Development Law Journal, 2010, 13, at 435. 
55
 Peter Robbins, Stolen fruit: the tropical commodities disaster (London: Zed Books, 2003). 
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Liz Young, World Hunger (London: Routledge, 1997), at 173. 
58
 Michael Fakhri, Sugar and the Making of International Trade Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014), at 30. 
59
 Anthony Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International 
Law.’ Harvard International Law Journal, 1999, 40(1), at 29. 
60
 David Kennedy, ’Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought.’ in David Trubek and Alvaros Santos (eds), 
The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
at 28-29 and 36. 
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ground’.61 Land ownership in many places in the global South continues to be skewed in 
favour of traditional landholding elites, many of whom continue to effectively obstruct or 
dilute efforts at land reforms that could enhance food production for domestic populations.62  
 
A further set of legal constraints carried over from the colonial period have a private law 
character.  During the colonial period, a system of international economic law was nascent, 
based on free trade, the gold standard and private international law. Newly independent 
nations seeking to trade had to join this game strictly on the terms proposed, that is, within 
the structure of legal rules already in place, or ‘starve in the dark’.63 While the legal status of 
colonies within the international legal order changed upon decolonisation, many of the terms 
and conditions of their engagement in global commerce remained in place. Yet, it was not 
only such colonial hangovers that ensured ongoing disadvantage for Southern populations. 
The prescripts of the new ‘inclusive’ international legal order, in particular, those emanating 
from the Bretton Woods economic institutions (BWIs), resulted in further interference in the 
domestic affairs of former colonies in line with the economic order of the day. Updating 
Anghie’s analysis, Sundhya Pahuja explores the role of international law in the facilitation of 
such ‘neo-colonial’ development practices.64 Nation-statehood and sovereignty, Pahuja 
reinforces, are not neutral legal categories but are shaped by their distinctively European 
lineage. It was in trying to obtain this political and legal status, she claims, that former 
colonies became vulnerable to development doctrine during the process of decolonisation. 
They positioned themselves in a historical continuum in which European states were to be 
emulated.65 The treatment of development as a technical issue under international law further 
disguised the highly political nature of the trespasses made on state sovereignty by 
international institutions. As Pahuja emphasises throughout her book, while development 
practices have not always taken an overtly legal form, they have been extended under the 
broader structures of international law and its claim to legality. 
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1. Development doctrine 
 
As Rist has noted, the main ingredients of development ‘doctrine’ in the post-war period 
have ‘hardly changed since’.66 They comprise the promotion of economic development by 
exporting raw materials, the fostering of comparative advantage supposed to benefit all 
market traders, and making productive use of foreign investment and capital.67 What has 
changed significantly, however, is accepted opinion on how the state should go about the 
ensuring the conditions for economic development. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
development policy focused on the role of the state in actively managing the economy and 
transforming traditional societies.68 A radical shift in the 1980s postulated the contrary: the 
state should refrain from ‘interfering’ with the economy, and should, in effect, self-dismantle 
in order to focus on ‘getting prices right’ by promoting fiscal discipline, removing distortions 
created by state intervention, and promoting liberalised trade with as few barriers to entry and 
exit as possible. The impact of both state-mandated developmentalism and the latter era of 
‘economics imperialism’69 on agricultural production has much to with creating the 
vulnerabilities that led to the global food crisis in 2007-11.  
 
In the post-war period, many former colonies embarked on a programme of import 
substitution industrialisation attempting to replicate the industrialisation model of developed 
states.70 Many governments in former colonies taxed farmers and rural populations 
transferring income to urban dwellers.71 This impacted dramatically upon the livelihoods of 
small farmers and resulted in an increased dependence of low-income countries on food 
imports. Critically, however, developing countries seeking to gain access to still-protected 
Northern markets were prevented by the operations of the emerging international trade 
regime (discussed below). This meant that their efforts at industrialisation not only 
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impoverished rural communities, they also failed to deliver the much sought-after increase in 
revenue.72  In the 1960s, a new solution for developing economies was found in the 
application of science and technology to the task of boosting crop yields. While delivering 
record levels of grain production, the so-called ‘Green Revolution’ exacerbated and 
entrenched conditions of food insecurity. Access to prescribed technologies favoured already-
wealthy farmers and prejudiced the interests of small farmers and local consumers.73 The 
Green Revolution also promoted fossil-fuel-reliant industrialised agricultural production, 
fostered reliance on expensive inputs, displaced local populations, and destroyed 
ecosystems.74 This also served to enhance the power of multinational companies and 
suppliers of these inputs. As George highlights, ‘any choice of technology automatically 
means also the choice of its supplier—the seller—and thus of a long-term partner’.75 
Agrifood, seed, fertiliser and pesticide companies expanded and became increasingly 
transnational in this period.76 
 
Recent scholarship has exposed the many flaws animating the ambitions of former 
colonies to industrialise. As Rist argues, economic strategies for industrialisation were 
pursued ‘as if the existence of industrial countries did not radically alter the context in which 
candidates for industrialization have to operate’.77 The world was conceived ‘not as a 
structure in which each element depends upon the others, but as a collection of formally 
equal “individual” nations’.78 Rist locates the tunnel vision of developing country 
governments in the power of economic ideology—that of the ‘self-made man’.79 Whilst 
economic ideology was doubtless influential, the view of the world as a collection of 
‘formally equal “individual” nations’ was also firmly impressed on countries in the South by 
the doctrines and categories of public international law.  
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2. Economics Imperialism 
 
The shift towards a more radical ‘free market’ agenda in the 1980s meant that market 
efficiency became the overriding objective of the development policy. Debt accumulated by 
developing countries as a result of dependence on oil and reliance on foreign capital to fund 
industrialisation was leveraged by the BWIs into strict conditions on the loans which it began 
extending to these countries, ostensibly to rescue them from this predicament. The 
philosophy behind ‘structural adjustment’ involved ‘putting exporters first, liberalising 
imports, privatisation and fiscal reform’.80 In line with this thinking, many states in the South 
were instructed to expand agricultural commodity exports in order to maximise the revenues 
available to service the foreign debt.81 They were further instructed to devalue their 
currencies in order to make their exports more competitive. However, as many countries were 
urged into a similar strategy at the same time, this resulted in oversupply of exports in which 
they were specialising—cash crops and tropical commodities.82 Again, development 
prescripts did not live up to their promise.  
 
Another condition of the loans granted by the IMF and World Bank was the liberalisation 
of agriculture.83 Government-controlled marketing boards that had acted as intermediaries 
between small farmers and multinational companies during the 1950s and 1960s were 
disbanded. Also discouraged and progressively dismantled were national grain reserves.84 
This left individual farmers with limited bargaining power to negotiate with large 
agribusiness, and resulted in declining terms of trade.85 In the contemporary context, Peter 
Rosset is one among many to have argued that the failure to keep adequate public grain 
reserves significantly worsened the effects of the market volatility in 2007-11.86 Financial 
liberalisation throughout the 1980s further opened up the economies of developing countries 
to destabilising flows of international capital. These changes divested governments of the 
ability to control the price of food domestically. A coercive relationship with the BWIs led to 
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an increasingly coercive relationship with global commodity markets. As George has argued, 
‘[a] nation loses its freedom of decision when it gears its production to exports whose prices 
it does not control in exchange for imports of the vital foods whose prices it does not control 
either’.87 More broadly, structural adjustment programmes impacted radically the ability of 
debt-burdened states to make social policy.88 Thus, the mandates imposed by international 
economic institutions have thus been a critical factor in the now lamented ‘absence’ of social 
safety nets, ‘lack’ of investment in agriculture, and ‘poor track record’ in agricultural 
production now being laid at the feet of domestic governments.  
 
Significantly, agricultural and financial liberalisation was only made possible by 
alternative legal arrangements facilitating market-based solutions to new currents of 
volatility, such as private insurance schemes. Contract-based ‘market technologies’— 
commodity futures and derivatives—were touted as an improved tool for price (and risk) 
regulation.89 However, many small farmers were unable to afford the minimum transaction 
required on futures markets—the minimum value for a contract for coffee in 2002 being 
$18,000.90 As Oxfam has underlined, where private traders have moved in to replace the 
state, they have sometimes done so on highly unfavourable terms for poor farmers.91 This 
assessment is only half correct. In fact, the state was not replaced by private traders, its role 
was reconfigured. Governments actively employed property and contract law, company law, 
bankruptcy and tax regimes, and competition law to constitute and operate markets in private 
law instruments —backed by national courts — to fulfil public goals of economic stability 
and financial risk management.92  
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B. Comparative Disadvantage and Disenfranchisement: International Trade and 
Investment Regimes 
 
It is now well established that the ability of countries in the South to ‘develop’ as 
enjoined was seriously curtailed by their inability to ‘join the club’ of the international trade 
regime.93 Agricultural products were almost entirely exempted from the most important 
General Agreement on Tariffs in Trade’s (GATT) market access obligations.94 The ability of 
the US and the states of the EU to continue subsidising agriculture through policies like 
Common Agricultural Policy transformed many of rich countries from net food importers to 
net food exporters over this period.95 Meanwhile, poorer countries, forced to lower barriers to 
entry for manufactured goods made in the North and encouraged to specialise in agricultural 
exports, were unable to gain access to Northern markets, leaving them in a highly precarious 
and disadvantaged position.96 Gonzales has argued that even on an ideational level 
comparative advantage disadvantages the global South. By de-historicising the relative 
advantages of nations in the global North and South it ‘relegates these nations to economic 
specialization in their traditional exports—even if this specialization was imposed rather than 
chosen and even if it is disadvantageous under current market conditions’.97 
 
In reply to the complaints of developing countries, the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), 
negotiated during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations between 1986 and 1994, 
purported to mitigate inequities in international agricultural trade by gradually dismantling 
agricultural subsidies in the Northern economies. However, ambiguities in the agreement’s 
key provisions enabled developed countries to maintain high levels of agricultural 
protectionism. Notably, whilst the AoA’s market access provisions required WTO members 
to convert quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers into tariffs, and to reduce 
these over time, the absence of specific guidelines on how to do so meant that the majority of 
developed countries engaged in ‘dirty tariffication’—the adoption of tariffs far more trade 
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restrictive than the non-tariff barriers they replaced.98 The highest tariffs were for sugar, 
tobacco, meat, milk products, cereals and, to a lesser degree, fruits and vegetables—precisely 
the products of particular interest to developing countries.99 The agreement also allowed 
countries that subsidised at the time to keep doing so, subject to certain reduction obligations, 
while prohibiting the introduction of new subsidies. These measures effectively granted 
exclusive rights to subsidise to wealthy states in the North, entrenching existing levels of 
market distortion.100 A 1999 study by the FAO on the impact of the AoA in sixteen 
developing countries found that the Agreement resulted in an increase in food imports and an 
accompanying decline in food production.101  
 
The shift over the past decade away from the ad hoc approach characteristic of the GATT 
to the pursuit of what Ostry has called ‘detailed legalisms’102 is often celebrated as a 
triumph.103 However, the harmonisation agreements negotiated under the auspices of the 
WTO has prejudiced developing countries by preventing them from enacting policies to 
improve their economic position globally. The reach of international influence over domestic 
policy has been extended by the designation policies that impact on trade indirectly as 
‘behind the border’ measures equating to ‘trade distortions’. As both Rorden104 and Lang105 
have explored, over time, a more radical free market agenda has been institutionalised at the 
WTO, and has been enforced and reinforced by a compulsory judicialised dispute-settlement 
regime.106 Agriculture and food security continue to be highly politicised topic, resulting in 
the prolonged deadlock of negotiations at the Doha Development Round.107 Nevertheless, the 
free trade agenda continues to be advanced through other regional arrangements relating to 
‘behind the border’ measures, such as the Transatlantic Trade Partnership (TTIP) and the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), currently under negotiation. The advent of Brexit and the 
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election of Donald Trump in the US have been suggested by some to herald the return to a 
more protectionist era.108 However, international institutions such as the Organisation for 
Economic Development (OECD) continue to push hard for the advancement of trade 
liberalisation, and many expect the TPP agenda to advance with or without the US.109 As 
concerns the European context, critics point to a new agreement that looks set to continue the 
advances made towards further liberalisation on a regional basis. As George Monbiot writes 
of the proposed Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU 
and Canada, ‘TTIP has been booed off the stage but another treaty, whose probable impacts 
are almost identical, is waiting in the wings’.110 An emerging consensus is that this sidestep 
into regionalism is likely to mean that low-income countries in the South are left with even 
less power over the elaboration of international trade rules than under the WTO regime.111 In 
a throw-back to the origin of the GATT, one again, powerful states appear to be in the 
business of creating trading clubs in which weaker countries are not offered a seat at the 
table, but are nonetheless forced to eat—or to not eat—as a consequence of their rules.  
 
Turning to international investment law (and returning to the period following 
decolonisation), the attempts of nationalist movements global South to use international law 
to advance their rights epitomise Pahuja’s thesis regarding the ‘false promise’ of international 
law.112Attempting to contest the claims of former colonists to their resources, new nations 
drew on the right of peoples and nations to self-determination to make a claim for ‘permanent 
sovereignty’ over their natural resources (PSNR). Attempts to articulate these rights as rights 
of ‘sovereignty’, however, developing countries conspired in the propertisation of natural 
resources which came to be discussed almost exclusively as commodities to be exploited.113 
Once propertised, the nationalisation of natural resources implicitly raised the question of 
compensation.114 Attempts to adjudicate these matters stalled, however, between 1959 and 
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1991, over 400 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) were signed worldwide.115 Typical 
provisions of BITs included terms governing compensation for expropriation, the repatriation 
of profits, dispute settlement procedures, national treatment requirements, and ‘most favoured 
nation’ requirements.116 All of these provisions served to simultaneously to protect the rights 
of foreign investors and to limit the ability of developing countries to redistribute land, 
renationalise industries, or carry out reform that could strengthen the ability of local 
communities to access land and resources to grow food. In the Sahel and East Africa, 
pastoralists have suffered acutely from the privatisation and fencing of common land, and the 
alienation of pastures for non-pastoral uses.117 Many of the unexplained ‘constraints’ now 
seen to impinge on the ability of small farmers to access land and resources stem directly 
from the protected rights of international investors. 
 
 
C. Making Market Power: Property, Contract, and Commodification 
 
That the food grains so essential to the diets of people throughout the global South were 
instead purchased by other market actors during the food crisis is now seen to be an 
inevitable, if unfortunate, part of the order of things.  Yet, as Polanyi has demonstrated, there 
is nothing particularly natural about a society based on individually self-interested market 
exchange.118 Existing social ties, both in pre-Industrial Europe and in Europe’s colonies, had 
to be torn down before they could be replaced with the legal relationships which are the pre-
conditions for a market economy.119 It may now seem futile to challenge the pre-eminence of 
these widely accepted social constructs. Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that norms 
of property and contract are the basis upon which the poor continue to be excluded, 
marginalised, and made dependent on inequitable market structures to access the most basic 
means of survival. Those who have lost out in the push for an industrial revolution, or in the 
march towards ‘civilisation’ and modernity, continue to lose out as a result of the legal rights 
that entrench the distribution of resources forged through these ‘advances’. Rights to exclude 
others from using land and resources, along with contractual relationships positioning the 
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interests of the contracting parties as paramount, are also the basis for contemporary conflicts 
over the creation of a global market in land and water rights. Often designated the ‘global 
land grab’, wealthy states and private actors are buying up farmland in the South to ensure 
future access to fertile soil. In 2011, Saudi Star PLC acquired 25,000 acres of fertile farmland 
over a sixty-year lease from the government of Ethiopia for rice export to the Middle East.120 
While the Ethiopian government claimed that no farmers were displaced as a result of the 
transaction, investigations reveal that government actors actively worked to remove 
communities from land prime for commercial agriculture, resulting in the displacement of 
approximately 135,000 households.121  As of 2012, private companies were estimated to be 
contracting for an area eight times the size of the UK.122   
 
As well as colonisation of farmland in the South, webs of contractual relationships allow 
for the domination of global commodity markets by agribusiness firms. The emergence of 
what some are calling a ‘Third Food Regime’—differentiated from the post-war global food 
order by a dominant role for global corporations profiting from agri-food chains123—has only 
possible by virtue of property and contract law. ‘Global value chains’ are now presided over 
by companies who have expanded both vertically and horizontally into new markets growing 
wheat, harvesting wheat, selling wheat, manufacturing bread, sourcing and refining fuel, 
modifying and patenting seeds, and selling agricultural insurance. Commodity buyers are 
now larger and more concentrated then previously, with the five largest traders in grains 
control seventy-five percent of the international trade in grains. They seek both vertical and 
horizontal consolidation by buying production units, and using explicit contract that create 
long-term arrangements with producers, and preferred supplier lists. 124  
 
A creative alchemy of contractual rights and financial formulae has added another layer 
of market entitlement that privileges the interests of the wealthy into the mix.  Basic future 
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contracts have been developed into commodity derivatives allowing financial traders an 
elective engagement with grain markets via ‘commodity options’,125 and channelling non-
professional investors into the market via instruments known as ‘commodity index funds’.126 
Until the food crisis, activity in commodity derivative markets was believed not to have any 
impact on the underlying price of tangible grains. What is more, law firms continue to 
develop derivatives, assigning new claims over underlying assets based on the assumption 
that each individual claim is separate and distinct. However, as Alessandrini has countered, it 
is precisely through the repetitive processes of enshrining the financial forumlae in legal 
instruments that asset prices are ‘discovered’, or, more accurately, produced.127 In commodity 
markets, this serves as a pricing signal that can impact upon a far broader range of people: 
farmers, merchants, supermarkets, and consumers. Encouraged by property and contract 
regimes, parties are trading as if it were only their rights and interests that were relevant; as if 
the market in commodity derivatives and the market for underling commodities were 
unconnected. Yet, as the events of the global food crisis clearly attest, unconnected is 
precisely what these two markets are not.   
 
The fact that the exercise of property rights and the use of contract is now pervasively 
normalised does not mean that these bodies of rules are either consistent, or wholly 
uncontested. There are both points of tension within and questions relating to their normative 
aspect. As Gorman stresses, large-scale land acquisitions are negotiated only in theory; 
investors have such leverage in choosing whether to purchase or lease the land, the time 
period of the lease, the conditions of the contract, and the amount of land to be acquired that 
there is rarely any bargaining on behalf of local populations.128 Transactions between large 
multinationals and poor farmers who have very low production substitutability, few 
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resources, and can’t afford to exit the market could raise questions of unconscionability—
even duress—in contract law. While futures-trading is now long established, there is a query 
as to how some of the foundational principles of the law of contract seem to have been 
brushed aside in the trading of futures instruments. How did it come to be that offering to buy 
a bushel of wheat and then failing to pay for it, or offering to sell a bushel of corn, and then 
failing to deliver it, is no longer considered a breach? Such concerns have prompted calls for 
governments to intervene and regulate derivatives trading and investments in land-grabbing. 
This is a call for legal intervention; yet, as this analysis has sought to highlight, the problem 
may be not the law that is not yet come, but the law that is already there.  
 
 
D. (International) Law and the Global Food System 
 
As with any market, law is constitutive of the international market in food commodities. 
On both the domestic and international planes, critical elements of economic exchange— 
capital, labour, credit, money, liquidity—are creatures of law.129 Legal rights, principles, 
institutions, documents, regulations, customs and actors are integral to the operation of the 
trade in any foodstuff. This is uncontested. The point that the above analysis has sought to 
impress is that what is typically overlooked as the constitutive law in the market also serves a 
regulatory function. Laws that constitute markets also inform how people act within markets, 
create permissions and prohibitions, and offer incentives and disincentives for behaviour. 
Since the period of European colonialism, legal doctrines that legitimate intervention in the 
domestic policymaking of only some states, alongside legal discourse that positions 
‘nationhood’ as status that countries must mimic European industrialisation to obtain, have 
paved the way for damaging interventions in the affairs of countries of the South by countries 
in the North. This has persisted, post-decolonisation, thanks to institutions at the heart of the 
international legal system that postulate a separation of the economic from the political, and 
that continue to prescribe policy for ‘developing’ countries in the guise of ‘technical advice’. 
Legal regimes relating to trade and investment have further circumscribed the policy space in 
which domestic governments operate, exacerbating disadvantage as a result of ‘equal 
treatment’ applied in conditions of considerable material inequality.  Finally, legal constructs 
that make food first and foremost a commodity, and therefore available to the highest bidder, 
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and that direct social interactions into self-serving market transactions, actively prevent 
populations in the global South from exercising meaningful control over the production, 
price, and politics of food.  
 
Taken together, these constitutive elements of the global legal order have created and 
regulated the operations of a global food system in which the advantages of Northern 
consumers and Northern companies predominate at the expense of the poor and vulnerable. 
The market ‘phenomena’ that international institutions are seeking to remedy through the 
application of law have to be recognised as being products of the global legal order. The 
significance of this for the viability of legal remedies to hunger and food insecurity will now 
be considered. 
 
 
4. Standing in the Way: What is Obstructing the Eradication of World 
Hunger? 
 
Publications such as the HLTF’s CFA and the FAO’s SOFI testify to the considerable 
sources and targeted interventions being marshalled to eradicate world hunger. Reading them, 
it is hard to imagine that these efforts will not meet with success in the near future.  
Millennium Development Goal 1C, which aimed to halve the proportion of people suffering 
from hunger by 2015, was narrowly missed. Although concerns have been raised over the 
credibility of the data used to monitor progress towards meeting the goals, progress has been 
made.130 This being the case, it also remains true that the numbers of people suffering hunger 
in the world today remain unacceptably high: 1 in 6, or 1 in 9, people are hungry globally, 
depending on which metrics are used to count them.131 Over 10 per cent of the population in 
countries classified as ‘developing’ continue to suffer from hunger.132 The final sections will 
discuss three limitations of present efforts to eradicate world hunger by the international 
community: institutional disavowal of responsibility for world hunger; the ongoing 
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prioritisation of market imperatives over the needs of hungry peoples; and the operations of 
existing bodies of law. 
  
 
A. Institutional disavowal 
 
In academic circles, recognition that Northern governments operating through 
international institutions have played an active role in producing hunger in the global South is 
growing. A number of scholars have been explicit about the role that law has played in this 
context. As Salomon writes, ‘[t]he rules that regulate the global economy, and their 
application, may not set out to exclude them from accessing goods that others with sufficient 
resources can secure, such as an adequate standard of living, food, clothing and housing, but 
they do.’133 This, as Chauvier has claimed, has to be recognized as a ‘negative externality’ of 
a global system set up to create profit rather than alleviate poverty.134 Gonzales is even more 
forthright in arguing that the WTO trade regime has ‘institutionalized inequality’ —a system 
which Lernar has gone so far as to claim amounts to ‘legalised theft’.135 One could reply to 
Salomon that some of the rules that regulate the global economy do set out to exclude others 
from accessing resources, most notably property rights. However, the issue under discussion 
is the cleavage between academic and institutional stances on the underlying reasons for the 
persistence of hunger. Nowhere in the HLTF’s extensive discussion of the global food crisis, 
or in the FAO’s many editions of SOFI, is there an acknowledgement of the roles that 
international institutions, policies, and legal regimes have played in worsening the position of 
the world’s vulnerable. The tension between academic scholarship that clearly attributes the 
prevalence of food insecurity to the laws and policies of Northern governments, and the 
reluctance of international institutions to explicitly acknowledge this fact is notable in the 
work of Olivier De Schutter, former Special Rapporteur on the right to food. When wearing 
his academic robes and co-authoring works with others, De Schutter has boldly intervened to 
point out the complicity of international policymakers in creating the disabling environment 
in which national governments attempt to make food security policy.136 Yet, in the reports 
produced in his role as Special Rapporteur, the blameworthy international is notably absent. 
Mistakes of the past are acknowledged, but it is uncommon to find mention of who made 
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them.137 When such mention is made, the governments of food insecure states are more 
typically put in the spotlight that the governments of wealthier states in the North.138 It might 
seem like a lot to ask to demand that any individual shake off the constraints of their office, 
and start pointing fingers. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the absent international is a big 
problem for efforts to tackle world hunger. Tacitly exonerating international institutions and 
ignoring the deep conflicts of interest between the South and the North with respect to 
agricultural production enables government officials to generously promise ‘food aid’ when 
they could be talking about reparations, or a wholesale revision of the international trade 
regime. The widespread institutional disavowal that international institutions have had 
anything to do with creating the conditions of hunger further undermines the current criteria 
on which solutions are sought. Accountability is, after all, one of the principles upon which 
food security solutions are now supposed to be based.139  
 
 
B. To market, to market 
 
Another limitation of contemporary efforts to respond to world hunger is the ongoing 
prioritisation of market imperatives over the needs of hungry people. This is evident in a 
number of ways. First, key objectives of the HLTF are to ‘[e]nsure sustained access to 
competitive, transparent and private-sector-led markets for food produce and quality inputs’, 
and to ‘build capacity for international financial markets to better meet needs of lower-
income countries’.140 Equally evident is a focus on legal reforms that facilitate markets and 
investment, such as the promotion of land ownership, transparent business regulations, 
contract enforcement, and the use of financial instruments as insurance.141 Despite the fact 
that markets have been shown to be adept at producing hunger and famine ‘with a 
vengeance’,142 the market continues to be positioned at the primary means by which the food 
insecure should access food. Second, and, perhaps, more worryingly, many of the same pre-
crisis prescriptions as to the role of markets in international trade persist.  Additional 
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recommendations in the HLTF’s CFA include enrolling small farmers in national plans for 
industrial agricultural production, strengthening and liberalising the multilateral trading 
system, minimising the use of export restrictions, and reducing constraints to an enabling 
environment that encourages private sector involvement in food markets.143 These solutions 
are being advanced under the banner of using agriculture as an ‘engine for economic 
development’.144 Again, the fact that the pursuit of market-based economic growth and 
development has historically worsened, rather than improved, the situation of many 
vulnerable communities is being underweighted. Uncritical endorsement of market solutions 
to hunger can also found in the writings of prominent legal academics. Trebilcock and Pue 
claim that ‘[s]tudies suggest that import capacity is best assured through pursuit of policies 
that advance the income of poor citizens through economic growth, for which trade can be a 
tool’.145 These authors also appear to advocate faith that markets will self-correct if further 
trade liberalisation is pursued. As they write, ‘[w]hile acknowledging legitimate concerns 
over the impact of recent price spikes on poor consumers, especially in developing countries, 
these impacts need to be put into a longer-term perspective… Prices that go up tend often to 
come down’.146 While this may be a fair macro assessment of historical trends in commodity 
markets, it does less justice to those who suffer hunger and are forced to sell vital resources 
to survive in the interim.  
 
The HLTF and FAO do recommend some changes to the operations of markets that could 
benefit poor and marginalized rural communities. On close consideration, however, many of 
those recommendations prescribe courses of action that would seem to be in tension with one 
another. Governments of food insecure states are urged to ‘[b]alance the need to ensure 
effective coverage of the vulnerable with the need to maintain efficient use of resources’;147 
and to simultaneously ‘[s]timulate private investment in agriculture’ whilst ‘enhancing secure 
and equitable access to natural resources’.148 According to scholars writing on food 
sovereignty, however, it has been this very fixation on market efficiency and creating the 
enabling conditions for private investment—access to land and resources, strong property 
rights, favourable labour conditions, and non-interventionist governments who won’t 
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nationalise or redistribute resources—that has been a leading factor in limiting the ability of 
many people in Southern regions to access the means to produce sufficient food in the first 
instance. The movement for ‘food sovereignty’—connoting people's democratic control of 
the food system—asserts that nothing less than the fundamental restructuring of the global 
food system will address the persistence of hunger. Originating with the peasant organisation, 
La Via Campesina, proponents advocate restructuring control over land and food in order to 
restructure market power.149 Its advocates acknowledge that there is an argument that markets 
organised by local communities to meet the needs of local consumers could improve the lives 
of hungry peoples. However, concerning those proposals that would continue to expose poor 
communities to the machinations of liberalised global commodity markets, and that would 
continue to advance the power of agribusiness firms—on the basis that increased agricultural 
production and access to markets will improve matters—the weight of the evidence stands 
clearly for the contrary. In the main, scholars who have sought to test out proposals for the 
‘inclusion’ of poor rural communities in market structures—be it through global value chains 
in the commodities trade or for access to finance—and who have investigated into the 
benefits of private investment for food production reach the same conclusion: more often 
than not including the poor and hungry in existing regimes of trade and finance serves to their 
distinct material disadvantage.150 
 
 
C. Law versus Law?! 
 
International legal solutions to challenges of food security come in four main guises: the 
proliferation of soft-law principles and guidelines, such as principles to promote responsible 
investment in agriculture;151 a call for the harmonisation of international trade law with 
human rights obligations;152 the promotion of the rule of law as a means by which domestic 
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laws in developing countries can be strengthened;153 and the empowering of the food insecure 
via the fulfilment of a human right to adequate food.154 This section will not attempt an 
exhaustive analysis of each of these proposals. Only one principal argument will be made on 
this issue, which is that many legal solutions to the challenge of world hunger are unlikely to 
work due to the simple fact that they fail to adequately account for the operation of other 
legal regimes that constitute the global food system. A couple of examples are illustrative. 
First, the evident limitation of soft-law guidelines and principles seeking to make markets 
more responsive to the needs of the hungry is that they lack any binding force. By contrast, 
no matter what the social stakes, property and contractual rights that exclude other people 
from accessing land and resources continue to be respected, protected, and fulfilled by 
governments and by courts. There is little question about which laws actually prevail here. 
Second, a similar clash of legal regimes is evident in the call to realign trade law with human 
rights law. While governments have committed to the ‘progressive’ realisation of the right to 
adequate food,155 they are already bound by commitments to enable and further liberalise 
trade (based, as discussed, on comparative disadvantage) to which they are signed up. Again, 
while a trade regime that complements instead of compromising human rights enjoyment is 
highly desirable, without fundamental revisions of the frameworks on which that regime 
currently operates, is it, in fact, possible? The stalling of the Doha development round and the 
side-step into mega- regional pacts such as TTIP and TPP would suggest not.  
 
The case of the rule of law promotion is somewhat different. In this instance, the issue is 
not the advancement of soft law principles that would appear to efface the existence of hard 
legal rights, or the proposal to progressively realise rights that may not be realisable without 
the significant readjustment of other regimes of right. Instead, as a growing number of critics 
have argued, advocating respect for the rule of law appears to the new means by which the 
rights of influential market actors and investors are further entrenched. Pahuja,156 
Humphreys,157 and Trubek and Santos,158 are a few among many who have argued that the 
‘imperialism of economics’ has given way to the ‘rule of law’ as the primary vehicle for the 
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dissemination of development doctrine. In the place of conditionality, or sometimes 
supplementing it, Humphreys argues, rule of law indicators are being operationalised to 
promote ‘the deliberate re-engineering, at a legal-structural level, of the economic, political 
and social basics of countries throughout the world’.159 The analysis he makes in support of 
this claim is persuasive. Whether one accepts the arguments of critical scholars or not, there 
is much that is questionable about asking governments and citizens in the South to ensure 
‘the protection of property rights’ and ‘the quality of contract enforcement’160—instruments 
that have historically served to their disadvantage—and to put them beyond the reach of 
democratic renegotiation. As the analysis above would suggest, and as the growing 
movement for food sovereignty would insist, precisely what is needed to mitigate against 
hunger and vulnerability is democratic control of the food system by the people who have 
historically been disenfranchised by that system.   
 
The case of human rights, and, most relevantly, the right to adequate food is also a special 
one. It cannot be doubted that the human rights community has done much to specify the 
particular needs of the hungry and to offer them a powerful vocabulary for articulating their 
claims for a more equitable global food system. Nevertheless, there continues to be hesitancy 
to accept that the realisation of the right to adequate food might not depend only on the 
elaboration of that right, but also on the revision of other legal rights that grant more market 
power to others. Is it possible to strengthen economic access to food for poor populations 
without weakening the entitlements of others—multinational companies, financial 
speculators? Can improvements to infrastructure, agricultural production techniques and 
social protections translate into food security when the price of basic staples can double in a 
day and drop a month later? Can a right to adequate food ‘trump’ a contract for the sale of 
one hundred tonnes of wheat to make a profitable price an affordable one? Human rights laws 
does not, as yet, seem to have come up with an answer that can resolve these serious conflicts 
of legal interest. As long as these questions continue to go unaddressed, further elaboration of 
the law seeking to ground a human right to adequate food would seem of limited practical use 
for the hungry.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
This article has argued that existing suppositions about the causes of ‘food insecurity’ 
must be challenged if another global food crisis is to be prevented, and if the goal of 
eradicating world hunger is to be met. Hunger, poverty and vulnerability to food price 
volatility are not merely the consequence of policy or market ‘failures’; these conditions are 
being actively produced through the legal constitution, regulation, and maintenance of an 
inequitable global food system. Until the legal rights and regimes that grant wealthier 
countries and consumers disproportionate market power over the poor are made explicit and 
adjusted, the proffering of soft law principles, regime harmonisation, and progressive human 
rights realisation by the international community have limited potential for success. The 
further extension, elaboration, and ratification of more poor-friendly legal rights may not be 
the solution to the plight of hungry peoples if they are unable to challenge existing laws that 
help to make them hungry, poor, and vulnerable in the first instance. 
 
 
